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NIGERIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL’S UNIVERSAL 
PERIODIC REVIEW: POTENTIAL FOR ACCULTURATION OR RISK OF 
REGRESSION? 
By  
DAMIAN ETONE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1960, considerable efforts were made 
to promote and protect human rights in Nigeria. The post-independence constitutions of Nigeria 
guaranteed human rights and instituted mechanisms for their enforcement.1 The Nigerian 
National Human Rights Commission was established in 1995.2 However, from 1966 to 1999, 
eight military coups destabilised Nigeria and negatively impacted on human rights protection 
in the country.3 There has since been a return to civilian rule with some relative gains in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. Nevertheless, extrajudicial killings, impunity by 
security forces and prolonged pre-trial detention have remained a human rights challenge.4 
These have become more challenging by the terrorism activities of Boko Haram, and the anti-
terrorism efforts of the government in striking a balance with respect for human rights. Many 
of these human rights issues have featured prominently in the engagement of Nigeria with the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism of the Human Rights Council. 
The UPR is a unique mechanism of the Human Rights Council (HRC) which relies entirely on 
cooperation and dialogue to implement human rights. Unlike other UN human rights 
mechanisms, states are the principal actors and reviewers in the UPR mechanism. The review 
takes place every 4.5 years in three main stages which include the preparation of state reports, 
review of the state in Geneva and the follow-up process. The four major principles underlying 
the review include objectivity, universality, cooperation and complementarity5 and with the 
                                                          
*LLB (Hons), LLM (Distinction), PhD; Lecturer, School of Law, Staffordshire University, UK. 
1 See Section 32, 1963; 42, 1979; and 46, 1999 Constitutions of Nigeria. 
2 It was established by the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act, 1995. In 2010, it was amended 
by the National Human Rights Commission Act, 2010, to enable it re-attained A Status. 
3 Jacob Abiodun Dada, Human Rights Protection in Nigeria: The Past, the Present and Goals for Role Actors for 
the Future’ (2013) 14 Journal of Law Policy and Globalisation, 5-6; D O Aihe, ‘Fundamental Human Rights and 
the Military Regime in Nigeria: What Did the Courts Say?’ (1971) 15 (2) Journal of African Law 213-244. 
4 See Nigeria National Human Rights Commission, The State of human rights in Nigeria: 2009-2010 (National 
Human Rights Commission 2010) 3-40. 
5 Human Rights Council, Institution Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, HRC Res. 5/1, UN 
HRC OR, 5th sess, Annex [IB], UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1 paras [3] and [4]. 
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principal objective of improving human rights situation on the ground.6 The legal basis of the 
review include the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, binding human 
rights treaties, voluntary pledges and commitments made by states and applicable international 
humanitarian law.7 The review equally welcomes the participation of NGOs, albeit limited, 
during the plenary session of the HRC when a state report is being adopted.8  The first cycle of 
the review (hereinafter UPR I) spanned from 2008-2011 and the second cycle (hereinafter UPR 
II) was undertaken from 2012-2016. 
I.1. Can the UPR be an Effective Human Rights Monitoring Mechanism? 
Whether the UPR is an effective mechanism for monitoring the human rights compliance of 
states has been a source of contention among many scholars. Some authors argue that human 
rights mechanisms that rely on the cooperation of states are weak and cannot meaningfully 
advance human rights.9 Olivier de Frouville argued that the UPR ‘has failed to live up to 
expectations’ because it overshadows the hard work of the treaty bodies, is wholly dependent 
upon the goodwill of states and cannot, as a political entity, make a legal assessment or 
interpretation of the human rights obligations of states.10 He advocates for a more 
confrontational mechanism - the establishment of a World Commission of Human Rights.11 
This echoes the sentiments of some international relations and international law scholars who 
advocate for a more coercive compliance paradigm. They contend that compliance  with  
human rights  norms  is  largely  a  function  of  powerful  states’ (or institutions’) willingness  
                                                          
6 ibid [4a]. 
7 ibid [1]; Nadia Bernaz has questioned some of the legal basis for the UPR see Nadia Bernaz, ‘Reforming the 
UN Human Rights Procedure: A Legal perspective on the Establishment of the Universal Periodic review’ in 
Kevin Boyle, New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford University Press, 2009) 79-82; There is also 
contention on the inclusion of humanitarian law as a basis for the review. See Lijiang Zhu, ‘International 
Humanitarian Law in the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council’ (2014) 5 Journal of 
International Humanitarian Legal Studies 186, 209-210. 
8 Human Rights Council, Institution Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, (note 5 above) [31]. 
9 Makau Mutua, ‘Looking past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-marginalising Enforcement 
(1994) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Review 211, 211-212; Keith, Linda Camp, ‘The United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?’ (1999) 36 Journal 
of Peace Research 95–118; Hafner-Burton Emilie and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, ‘Justice Lost! The Failure of International 
Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most’ (2007) 44 (4) Journal of Peace Research: 407–25. 
10 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Building a Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights’ in M.Cherif Bassouni 
and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN 
Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia, 2011) 250-55; For a similar 
argument see Nadia Bernaz, ‘Reforming the UN Human Rights Protection Procedures: A Legal Perspective on 
the Establishment of the Universal Periodic Review’ in Kevin Boyle (ed), New Institutions for Human Rights 
Protection (Oxford University Press, 2009) 79-91. 
11 Olivier also supports the establishment of a World Court of Human Rights see De Frouville (note 10 above) 
264-265. 
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to  enforce  them.12 An alternative argument is that human rights institutions can only create 
impact when created with the power to enforce the norms and punish state violation.13  
Another strong critic of the UPR mechanism is Manfred Nowak. Nowak, former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, argues that the UPR ‘suffers from the disadvantage that states’ 
performance in the field of human rights is assessed by other states rather than by independent 
experts.’14 For Nowak, the UPR, by not permitting special rapporteurs and treaty body experts 
to participate in the review, undermines the work of the treaty bodies and special procedures. 
The general presumption which underlies the criticisms of de Frouville and Nowak is that 
monitoring human rights implementation is best tackled by human rights expert bodies rather 
than states.  However, their analyses undermine the potential value of the UPR and do not 
provide empirical data on whether the UPR is effective or not in improving the human rights 
situation of states.  
Exclusive reliance on “strong” enforcement mechanisms would undermine the potential of 
cooperative mechanisms. Avoiding human rights rhetoric or ritualism does not necessary 
require “strong” enforcement mechanism. About 25 years ago, Opsahl advocated for the 
necessity of a “softer approach” rather than the traditional notion of “right-breach-
responsibility-process-sanction, leading to punishment of any violator or at least to redress for 
any victim.”15 Kenneth Roth has argued that coercive mechanisms are not suitable to deal with 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.16 There has also been evidence that questions 
the effectiveness of coercive mechanisms. Empirical analysis from 1981-2000 concluded that 
                                                          
12 Stephen D Krasner, ‘Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights’ in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds),  
Regime Theory And International Relations (Clarendon Press, 1995) 165–67; A M Weisburd, ‘Implications of 
International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human Rights’ (1999) 38 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 45, 101–11. 
13 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Building a Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights’ in M Cherif Bassouni 
and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN 
Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia 2011) 253-66; Henry J Steiner, 
‘Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?’ in Phillip 
Alston and James Crawford (eds), The Future of United Nations Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 15. 
14 Manfred Nowak, ‘It’s Time for a World Court of Human Rights’ in  M Cherif Bassiouni and William A Schabas 
(eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery (Intersentia, 2011), 23. 
15 Torkel Opsahl, ‘Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights’ (1989) 10(1-2) Human Rights Law Journal 
13, 31-32.   
16 Kenneth Roth is the executive director of Human Rights Watch. See Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by and International Human Rights Organization’ (2004) 26 
(1) Human Rights Quarterly 63. 
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“economic sanctions deteriorate citizens’ physical integrity rights”17 especially when directed 
towards dictatorial regimes.18 The UPR mechanism which relies on cooperation and gives the 
state some degree of control over the process can be sometimes at least as, if not more effective 
than coercive mechanisms. 
Since 2012, Rhona Smith, Helen Quane and Takele Bulto have analysed the impact of the UPR 
in different regions.19 Smith’s 2012 case study of Pacific Island states demonstrated that these 
states actively engaged with the interactive dialogue of their reviews during UPR I and were 
receptive to UPR recommendations. Smith, nevertheless, pointed to the fact that their 
engagement was limited by their inability to participate in the review of other states due to 
technical and financial constraints.20 With regards to states within the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Quane argued in 2015 that the UPR mechanism has enhanced the 
relationship between ASEAN states and the global human rights mechanisms.21 According to 
Quane, the UPR impacts other mechanisms by making particular recommendations which have 
increased their engagement with the UN treaty bodies and special procedures.22 Quane’s case 
study also highlighted the fact that disagreements on the death penalty and the rights of LGBT 
persons have limited the engagement of many states in the region.23 In Bulto’s 2015 general 
analysis on Africa, he found that African states engage more with the UPR mechanism than 
with other human rights mechanisms because of the almost complete control they have over 
                                                          
17 Dursun Peksen, ‘Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights’ (2009) 46 (1) Journal 
of Peace Research, 59. Also relevant is Mohamed Bennouna, ‘Les sanctions économiques des Nations Unies’ 
(2002-I) 200 RCADI 9, 40-47. 
18 Cristiane Careniero and Dominique Elden, ‘Economic Sanctions, Leadership survival and human rights’ (2009) 
30(3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 969.   
19 See Helen Quane, ‘The Significance of an Evolving Relationship: Asian States and the Global Human Rights 
Mechanisms’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 283; Rhona Smith, ‘A Review of African States in the First 
Cycle of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 346; Rhona Smith, ‘The Pacific Island States: Themes Emerging from the United Nations Human Rights 
Council’s Inaugural Universal Periodic Review’ (2012) 13(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law, 569; 
Takele Soboka Bulto, ‘Africa’s Engagement with the Universal Periodic Review: Commitment or Capitulation’ 
in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and 
Ritualism (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 235-55. 
20 Smith, ‘The Pacific Island States: Themes Emerging from the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 
Inaugural Universal Periodic Review’ above n 19, 594. 
21 ASEAN is an inter-governmental Asia regional arrangement comprising of 10 member states with the aim of 
promoting political, economic and social cooperation and regional stability. See Quane, ‘The Significance of an 
Evolving Relationship: ASEAN States and the Global Human Rights Mechanisms’ above n 19, 289. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid 289-95. 
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the outcome of the UPR process.24 But he argues that their engagement lacks genuine 
commitment and is a manifestation of rights ritualism.25 
This article provides the first comprehensive empirical analysis of Nigeria’s engagement with 
the UPR mechanisms. It underscores the value of cooperation in monitoring human rights 
compliance by examining the effectiveness of Nigeria’s engagement with the UPR mechanism. 
To evaluate the ‘effectiveness’ of Nigeria’s engagement with the UPR, I employ an approach 
which evaluates ‘effectiveness’ in terms of the level of state commitment to the UPR process, 
participation during the review sessions and the aggregate percentage of implemented UPR 
recommendations. The benefit of this approach is that it provides important indicators to a 
state’s level of engagement and enables a comprehensive assessment of that engagement by 
examining state engagement with the key stages of the UPR process.26 Also, this article 
considers the potential for acculturation and the impact of conflicts and terrorism on Nigeria’s 
engagement with the UPR. 
II. NIGERIA AS A STATE UNDER REVIEW (SUR) 
Nigeria was reviewed by the UPR WG in February 2009 and October 2013 respectively. As a 
result of its membership of the HRC, the Nigerian government entered voluntary pledges and 
commitments which are included as part of the assessment basis for its review. Fifty-two states 
made recommendations to Nigeria during UPR I, 13 of which were African states. Out of a 
total of 3227 recommendations, 30 were accepted by the government of Nigeria. It accepted all 
the recommendations from African states. During UPR II, all states made a total of 219 
recommendations to Nigeria of which it accepted 84%. The high acceptance level evident in 
both UPR cycles indicates an active engagement with the recommendations. Some states like 
                                                          
24 Bulto’s analysis was a general evaluation of the participation of African states during UPR I. He did not engage 
in any specific case studies in his analysis. See Bulto, above n 19. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For more details on this approach See Damian Etone, ‘The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Engagement with 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR): Potential for Ritualism?’ (2017) 33 (2) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 258, 260-61. 
27 These recommendations were gleaned from the WG reports. See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Nigeria, 11th sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Doc A/HRC/11/26 (5 
October 2009) (‘HRC UPR I Report – Nigeria’), paras 18-24; several of these recommendations include more 
than one category of recommendation covering one or more issue(s). In the analysis in figure 4.5, these 
recommendations were separated to identify each in its own category and to easily identify implementation level. 
This totalled 115 recommendations. This total correspond with that stated by UPR info. See UPR Info < 
http://s.upr-info.org/1G1cXQV>.   
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Botswana, China and South Sudan did not accept more than 50% of recommendations made to 
them during UPR I. South Sudan in particular did not accept more than 85% of the 
recommendations made to it during UPR I.28 Figures 1 and 2 below provide an analysis of 
Nigeria’s engagement as a state under review. It depicts its review by African states compared 
to other groups of states.29 The category of recommendations and areas where Nigeria was 
most engaged are further examined in figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 above indicate that Nigeria engaged with recommendations within and outside 
its regional group. However it maintained a stronger engagement within its African regional 
group. As seen in figure 1, Nigeria accepted all the recommendations from African states 
during UPR I. This constituted 21% of the total recommendations made to Nigeria during UPR 
I. Figure 2 shows that during UPR II it rejected only about 1% of recommendations from 
                                                          
28 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Sudan: 
Addendum- Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the 
State under review, 18th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/18/16/Add.1 (16 September 2011) paras 1-35. 
29 There are 5 regional groups in the HRC: Group of African States; Group of Asian States; Group of Eastern 
European States (EEG); Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC); and Group of Western 
European and other States (WEOG). See Human Rights Council, GA Res 60/251, UN GAOR, 60th sess, 72nd plen 
mtg, Agenda Items 46 and 120, UN Doc A/Res/60/251 (3rd April 2006) (‘Resolution 60/251’) para 7. 
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African states compared to about 9% of the recommendations rejected from WEOG. This 
finding would indicate that Nigeria is more receptive of intra-African recommendations and 
more likely to reject recommendations from Western states. 
There was a remarkable increase in the total number of recommendations made to Nigeria 
across both cycles of the review, from 32 during UPR I to 219 during UPR II. The increase in 
the number of recommendations made to Nigeria may reflect the general increase in the 
number of recommendations which was evident during UPR II.30 However there may be other 
particular factors which may explain the rise in the number of recommendations to Nigeria. 
These are the escalation of the conflict between the government and Boko Haram after UPR 
I,31 the enactment of the Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act in 2013 and the resumption of the 
death penalty in Nigeria.32  38 recommendations during UPR II were dedicated to addressing 
these three issues.  The last two issues constituted the total 35 recommendations which were 
rejected by Nigeria during UPR II and the two rejected during UPR I. No recommendation on 
sexual orientation and gender identity was made by an African state (with the exception of 
Madagascar) and none of the recommendations made by non-African states on this issue were 
accepted by the Nigerian delegation. These recommendations were found by many African 
states to be “hyper-sensitive in political, social and/or cultural terms”33 and “contravened 
deeply held beliefs or policy positions of governments.”34 Three African countries made 
recommendations related to the abolition of the death penalty.35 While Nigeria did not accept 
recommendations which related to the abolition of the death penalty, it surprisingly made a 
similar recommendation to Argentina.36  
                                                          
30 Edward R McMahon, Kojo Busia and Marta Ascherio, ‘Comparing Peer Reviews: The Universal Periodic 
Review of the UN Human Rights Council and the African Peer Review Mechanism’ (2013) 12 African and Asian 
Studies 266, 280-82. 
31 Two bombings in the capital, Abuja in 2011 resulted in this escalation of violence. See Simeon H O Alozieuwa, 
‘Contending Theories on Nigeria’s Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency’ (2012) 7(1) Peace 
and Conflict Review 1. 
32About 600 people in early 2015 were on death row see Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A 
Worldwide Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2015) 274. 
33 Edward McMahon, ‘The Universal Periodic review:  A Work in Progress, An Evaluation of the First Cycle of 
the New UPR Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2012) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 1, 18. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The recommendations were made by Togo, Benin and Rwanda respectively. 
36 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Argentina’, 8th 
sess, UN Doc A/HRC/8/34 (13 May 2008) para 64.21. 
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Figures 3 and 4 below examine the categories of recommendations and issues raised during 
Nigeria’s UPR I and II. Figure 3 below examines the categories of recommendations and issues 
raised during Nigeria’s UPR I and II. I adopted the verb-based action category developed by 
Professor McMahon which categorises UPR recommendations into various ranks, from 
recommendations requiring minimal action to the more specific ones.37 R1 recommendations 
are those which required minimal actions such as to seek technical assistance or share 
experiences. R2 recommendations emphasized continuity and required the state under review 
to continue certain actions taken towards improving the human rights situation within their 
state. R3 recommendations called upon the state to consider implementing particular 
recommendations. Recommendations of a general character or which required the state to 
intensify or strengthen protection for human rights were categorised as general 
recommendations (R4). The recommendations which required specific action on the part of the 
state, for example to ratify, amend or adopt specific legislation were categorised as specific 
(R5) recommendations. 
 
As figures 3 and 4 indicate, Nigeria was receptive to both general (R4) and specific (R5) 
recommendations. A majority of the recommendations accepted by Nigeria were general 
recommendations (R4) and this constituted about 37 and 39 percent of the total 
recommendations during UPR I and II respectively. The fact that such recommendations are 
                                                          
37 Edward McMahon, (note 33 above). 
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general does not mean that they are meaningless. Nigeria also engaged with a good number of 
specific recommendations but only to the extent that they did not involve issues of the death 
penalty and sexual orientation which have tended to be politically contentious in socio-cultural 
terms within Nigeria. About 23% of the 26 specific recommendations (R4) rejected by Nigeria 
during UPR I were on the death penalty and discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Similarly, during UPR II, recommendations on the death penalty and sexual orientation 
accounted for 95% of the 24 specific recommendations rejected by Nigeria. This indicates a 
cultural relativist tendency in the engagement of Nigeria with the UPR. 
However, while the Nigerian government was not receptive to recommendations on the above 
two issues, it was receptive to other human rights issues that dominated both cycles of its 
review. Table 1 below lists the top 15 issues that received recommendations during Nigeria’s 
UPR I and II. The human rights issues on the table are clustered based on the frequency with 
which states made recommendations. A similar classification has been used by UPR Info and 
by Nigerian Human Rights Commission.38 
Table 1 
UPR I UPR II 
Rank Issue Total No. 
of Recom. 
(UPR I) 
% of 115 
Recom. 
(UPR I) 
Rank Issue Total No. 
of Recom. 
(UPR II) 
% of 219 
Recom. 
(UPR II) 
1 Women’s 
Rights 
24 20.87 1 Rights of the 
Child 
53 24.2 
2 Rights of the 
Child 
17 14.78 2 Women’s 
Rights 
46 21 
3 Torture and 
other CID 
Treatment 
17 14.78 3 International 
Instruments 
40 18.26 
4 Justice and 
Detention 
17 4.78 4 Death Penalty 25 11.42 
5 International 
Instruments 
13 11.3 5 Justice and 
Detention 
25 11.42 
6 Death Penalty 12 10.43 6 Right to 
Education 
23 10.5 
                                                          
38 UPR Info, ‘Issue Categorisation’ < https://www.upr-info.org/database/files/Database_Issues_explanation.pdf>; 
The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, Report on State of Compliance with International Minimum 
Standards of Human Rights by Nigeria under the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism < 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=556&file=EnglishTranslation>.  
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7 Minorities 8 6.96 7 Torture and 
other CID 
Treatment 
20 9.13 
8 Human Rights 
Education and 
Training 
8 6.96 8 Human Rights 
Education and 
Training 
17 7.76 
9 Technical 
Assistance and 
Cooperation 
8 6.96 9 Right to Health 17 6.39 
10 Right to 
Education 
6 5.22 10 Freedom of 
religion and 
Belief 
16 7.31 
11 Special 
Procedures 
5 4.35 11 Sexual 
Orientation 
10 4.57 
12 NHRI 5 4.35 12 Disability 10 4.57 
13 Extra-judicial 
Killing 
5 4.35 13 Minorities 8 3.65 
14 Corruption 4 3.48 14 Trafficking 7 3.2 
15 Right to 
Health 
4 3.48 15 Violations by 
State Agents 
6 2.74 
As indicated on the table above, the three issues which came up prominently during the UPR I 
of Nigeria were women’s rights, the rights of the child and torture and other cruel, inhumane 
and degrading treatment. None of these recommendations were rejected by Nigeria. The NGO 
UPR I Coalition of Nigeria prioritised similar recommendations including women and children 
rights, torture and extra-judicial execution.39 During UPR II, women and children’s rights were 
predominant recommendations by states to Nigeria as indicated on Table 1, as well as by 
NGOs.40 The government was receptive to recommendations on these prominent issues that 
arose during UPR I and II, and by engaging with the recommendations of its peers, the state 
may be indirectly engaging with NGO recommendations. It accepted recommendations such 
as to “[c]riminalize torture and establish an independent monitoring system of detention 
places,” “[e]nact legislation to prohibit FGM,” “Fully implement its national action plan... to 
meaningfully involve women in peace process and to combat gender-based violence and 
discrimination” and “[s]ign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR and the Optional 
                                                          
39 Nigeria’s Civil Society Coalition on the UPR, ‘Universal Periodic Review of Nigeria: A Nigeria Civil Society 
Coalition Report’ (2008) 1-5 <https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/nigeria/session_4_-
_february_2009/js1ngauprs42009constitutionalrightsprojectetaljoint.pdf>. 
40 Civil  Society  Coalition  on  Minority Protection,  Indigenous  Peoples  Issues    and  Children’s  Rights (CS-
COMIC), ‘Submission By Civil Society Coalition On Minority Protection, Indigenous Peoples Issues And 
Children’s Rights’ (2013) 9-10 < https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/nigeria/session_17_-
_october_2013/js5_upr17_nga_e_main.pdf>. 
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Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure”.41 Such 
an outcome shows the state is willing to rethink their policies and consider adopting 
international human rights treaties as a result of constructive dialogue and their participation in 
a cooperative mechanism, but also depending on whether the outcome was followed up. 
While sexual orientation did not feature among the top 15 issues raised during the review of 
Nigeria, the death penalty came up among the top six issues raised during both cycles of 
Nigeria’s review. Recommendations on the death penalty represented about 10% of the total 
recommendations made during UPR I and about 11% of the recommendations made during 
UPR II. This underlines the importance of the death penalty in the review of Nigeria which has 
across both reviews gained more prominence (from 6th to 4th position). The Nigerian UPR 
delegation rejected all the recommendations during UPR I and II which directly called for the 
abolition of the death penalty except the UPR I recommendations by Argentina and Benin that 
Nigeria considers the possibility of abolishing the death penalty in the near future.42 This 
demonstrates the limits of Nigeria’s receptiveness to particular UPR recommendation. 
III. THE EXTENT OF NIGERIA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF UPR RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section examines the extent to which Nigeria implemented its UPR commitments and the 
compliance gap between the accepted and the implemented commitments.43 It argues that the 
number of full and partially implemented recommendations underscore the potential of the 
UPR process to contribute to either fully effect or trigger domestic human rights changes. 
While the wide decoupling gap between the implemented recommendations and accepted 
recommendations signals that the government needs to effectively engage with the mechanism, 
I argue that acculturation can narrow the gap overtime through the internal and external 
audience effects generated by effective NGO engagement.  
III.1 How Implementation was Measured 
                                                          
41 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Nigeria, 25th sess, 
Agenda Item 6, UN Doc A/HRC/25/6 (16 December 2013) (‘HRC UPR II Report –Nigeria’), paras 135.73, 135.56 
and 135.1.  
42 Human Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council on its twenty-fifth session, 25th sess, UN Doc 
A/HRC/25/2 (27 May 2014), paras 1 and 14. 
43 Since UPR II implementation stage was still ongoing, I limited the analysis to UPR I. 
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A coalition of 39 domestic NGOs known as Human Rights Agenda Network (HRAN) provided 
responses on each of the recommendations in their report.44 The Nigerian National Commission 
for Human Rights (NCHR) also provided commentary on the Nigeria’s UPR I 
recommendations and the extent of state compliance.45 Amnesty International (AI), 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), Centre for Reproductive Rights (CRR), 
BAOBAB for Women’s Human Rights (BWHR) and Cleen Foundation (CF) also provided 
relevant useful responses to UPR Info which will be used here. The responses of the Nigeria 
government were extracted from its UPR II national report which commented on the extent of 
their implementation of UPR I recommendations. 
I use the Implementation Recommendation Index (IRI) to measure Nigeria’s implementation 
of its UPR I recommendations. The IRI is an index developed by UPR Info which brings 
together an average of stakeholders’ responses. It shows the implementation level of states for 
recommendations that were received by the state during the UPR review. The value of this 
index is that it takes in to account stakeholders’ responses and any dispute which they may 
have over the implementation of a recommendation. Implementation is not binary. This index 
captures three stages of implementation. When all stakeholders agree that a recommendation 
was fully implemented the recommendation is scored 1. Whenever a stakeholder claimed that 
no aspect of a recommendation was been implemented, the index score is 0. The score is 0.75 
when the state under review claims that the recommendation has been fully implemented but a 
stakeholder says it has only been partially implemented.  In some cases, partial implementation 
of a recommendation was indicative that an action was started by the state such as introducing 
a bill but the final action, enacting a law, was not realised. The average of the scores is then 
transformed into an implementation level where 0-0.32 = Not Implemented, 0.33-0.65 = 
Partially Implemented and 0.66-1 = Fully Implemented. 
A major challenge in measuring state UPR implementation is that the UPR is a dynamic and 
on-going process. As such recommendations which this index may classify as implemented or 
not implemented may have subsequently changed. To control the changes which may 
                                                          
44 Human Rights Agenda Network (HRAN) ‘Written Submission to Universal Periodic Review of Nigeria, Oct-
Nov 2013’ (2013) < 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=148&file=EnglishTranslation>.  
45 Full version available at OHCHR< 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=556&file=Annexe1>.  
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subsequently occur, the implementation measured is restricted within the implementation time 
frame allocated for each review. Another major difficulty encountered in indexing the 
implementation level of Nigeria’s UPR I recommendations was the fact that a recommendation 
sometimes embodied more than 1 recommendations. As such the full implementation of one 
recommendation but not the other resulted in a partial implementation level. The 
implementation time for Nigeria to implement its UPR I recommendations ran from February 
2009 when the UPR working group adopted its UPR report till July 2013 when it submitted its 
UPR II report.  
In addition, this research is aware of the difficulty attempting to establish a precise causal link 
between UPR recommendations and the actions of states. This is difficult due since changes in 
the human rights practices of states can be motivated by multiple factors. However, the 
influence of the UPR recommendations is measurable with some confidence by analysing both 
state and NGO implementation reports to determine the extent to which the UPR contributed 
to human rights change within states. Other relevant studies on the UPR accept and use similar 
methodology.46 
III.2 Extent of Implementation 
Within the implementation period Nigeria, implemented either fully or partially about 43% of 
the commitment made during its UPR I. With regard to the pledges and commitments it made 
to the HRC, Nigeria fulfilled some of them. From among the stakeholders, only the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in its UPR II report47 directly addressed the level of 
implementation. However, some of the pledges and commitments made by Nigeria 
corresponded to some of the recommendations made by states during Nigeria’s UPR I review.48 
Other stakeholders indirectly provided responses to the pledges in their reports on Nigeria’s 
implementation of UPR recommendations. To comply with some of its pledges and 
                                                          
46 See Subhas Gujadhur and Marc Limon, Towards the Third Cycle of the UPR: Stick or Twist? Lessons Learnt 
from the first ten years of the Universal Periodic Review (Universal Rights Group, 2016) 35-7; UPR Info, 
‘Universal Periodic Review: On the Road to Implementation’ (2012) 63 <http://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/2012_on_the_road_to_implementation.pdf>. 
47 See National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, ‘Report on State of Compliance with International 
Minimum Standards of Human Rights by Nigeria under the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism’ < 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=556&file=EnglishTranslation> 2. 
48 For example Nigeria undertook to accelerate the process full domestication of international human rights treaties 
and this correspond to its second UPR I recommendation made by Ghana, Norway, Niger, Algeria and Brazil. For 
details on the pledges and commitments made by Nigeria see OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council: Nigeria’s 
Voluntary Pledges and Commitments’ www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/nigeria.pdf. 
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commitments, Nigeria ratified the ICRMW; deposited its National Action Plan (NAP) which 
amended the National Human Rights Commission Act to grant the NHRC independence, 
investigative and enforcement powers; and diplomatically intervened to restore peace and 
democracy in Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Mali.49 
On the UPR recommendations, actions were triggered on some at the end of UPR I. Out of a 
summary of 30 recommendations accepted by Nigeria, about 10% were fully implemented (FI), 
about 33% were partially implemented (PI), about 53% was not implemented (NI) and about 
3% of the recommendations were not assessed because UPR stakeholders did not provide any 
information in relation to their implementation. Figure 5 below represents percentages of the 
recommendations that were FI, PI and NI. 
 
As indicated above, about 43% of the UPR recommendations Nigeria accepted was either fully 
or partially implemented while about 53% was not implemented. On the FI recommendations, 
the state, the NHRC, domestic and some international NGOs agreed on the full implementation 
of some of these recommendations. For example the state,50 NCHR51 and Amnesty 
                                                          
49See National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria (note 47 above).  
50 HRC UPR II State Report – Nigeria (note 41 above) para 32. 
51 National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, ‘National Human Rights Commission Table of Commentary 
on 2009 UPR recommendations and the extent of Compliance’ < 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=556&file=Annexe1>. 
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International52 were in agreement that recommendation 4 relating to the amendment of the 
Human Rights Commission Act to grant the NHRC independence, investigative and 
enforcement powers had been fully implemented. This greatly contributed to the Commission 
attaining an ‘A’ status at the International Coordinating Committee of Human Rights a year 
after. Similarly, the response of Human Rights Agenda Network (HRAN), a leading domestic 
NGO,53 did not dispute that the government had continued to invest in education within the 
relevant time. As such the recommendation in this regard was fully implemented. 
On the partially implemented recommendations, the government of Nigeria had triggered the 
process of implementation on some of the recommendations even though not yet completed. 
In some of the recommendations, both the state and the stakeholders agreed that the 
recommendation had only been partially implemented. On others there were dispute not only 
between the state and the stakeholders but equally among the stakeholders. For example, 
HRAN54, NHRC55 and the government of Nigeria56 all accepted that recommendation 1 
relating to accession to human rights instruments to which Nigeria is not yet a party had only 
been partially implemented. This featured among the top five recommendations that were made 
to Nigeria (See Table 1 above). Recommendation 28 required the government to take steps to 
bolster the national health system. While the NHRC57 and the state58 agreed that steps have 
been taken in this regard, HRAN’s response was not in agreement with this.59 Relevant studies 
on the Nigerian health system indicated that the system was deplorable and the attitude of 
health care workers towards patients was very poor.60  
                                                          
52 Amnesty International (AI), ‘Universal Periodic Review of Nigeria: Submission by Amnesty International, 17th 
Session Of The UPR Working Group, October 2013 (July 2013) IOR 41/011/2013, 2 < 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=557&file=EnglishTranslation>. 
53 A coalition of 39 domestic NGOs. See Human Rights Agenda Network (HRAN) ‘Written Submission to 
Universal Periodic Review of Nigeria, Oct-Nov 2013’ (2013) < 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=148&file=EnglishTranslation 8>.  
54 Ibid 2. 
55 National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, ‘National Human Rights Commission Table of Commentary 
on 2009 UPR recommendations and the extent of Compliance’ above n 51, para 1.  
56 HRC UPR II State Report – Nigeria (note 41 above), para 22. 
57 The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, above n 51, [28] 
58 HRC UPR II State Report – Nigeria (note 41 above), [102]. 
59 Human Rights Agenda Network (HRAN), above n 53, 7. 
60 See Ajovi Scott-Emuakpor, ‘The Evolution of Health Care Systems in Nigeria: Which way Forward in the 
Twenty-First Century’ (2010) 51(2) Nigerian Medical Journal 53; Nigeria National Human Rights Commission, 
Research Study on Human Rights and Maternal Mortality: Pilot Study on Women’s Access to Health Care 
Facilities in the Six Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (National Human Rights 
Commission, 2015) 29-30. 
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The few recommendations that were fully implemented covered issues on the National Human 
Rights Institution, education and raising awareness among cultural and religious leaders. Many 
of the recommendations which had not been implemented concerned issues such as justice and 
detention, women’s rights, torture and extra-judicial executions. With the exception of extra-
judicial executions, they were among the 5 prominent issues that received the most 
recommendations during Nigeria’s UPR 1, and constituted about 42% of the total 
recommendations made to Nigeria during UPR I (See Table 4.1 above).  The relevance and 
effects of the non-implementation of these four issues is examined below. While the state took 
some steps towards implementation outside the UPR I implementation timeframe, these issues 
still raise serious human rights concern in Nigeria. 
III.2.1 Justice and Detention 
Access to justice and detention conditions have been persistent problems in Nigeria. Mary 
Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, pointed out that the “way in 
which justice is administered is a key benchmark of a country’s commitment to human 
rights”.61 The right to fair trial and freedom from arbitrary arrest are enshrined in sections 35 
and 36 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria but these provisions have largely not been 
implemented.62 In its 2010 report on the state of human rights in Nigeria, the Nigerian NHRC 
recommended that the justice administration should be overhauled.63 A 2012 national prison 
audit undertaken by the Nigerian NHRC highlighted major issues. The prisons were old and 
dilapidated, congested and appalling prison facilities.64 More than 18,000 detainees had spent 
a long time awaiting trial with some having spent up to 16 years awaiting trial.65 Another prison 
audit exercise undertaken by the NHRC in 2014 at the Kuje Medium Security Prison, Abuja, 
reported that 86 detainees have been awaiting trial for at least 3years.66 In 2009 there were 71 
cases of unlawful arrest and detention reported by the NHRC. In 2010, this number rose to 497 
                                                          
61 Mary Robertson, A Voice for Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 255 
62Nigeria National Human Rights Commission, The State of Human Rights in Nigeria: 2009-2010 (National 
Human Rights Commission, 2010) 60. 
63 Ibid. 
64 The audit report revealed that out of 50,645 persons detained, about 70% were awaiting trial. See The National 
Human Rights Commission Nigeria, National Prison Audit 2012 (The National Human Rights Commission, 
2014) 3-11. 
65 The audit report revealed that out of 50,645 persons detained, about 70% were awaiting trial. See The National 
Human Rights Commission Nigeria, National Prison Audit 2012 (The National Human Rights Commission, 
2014) 5 and 17. 
66 The National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, Annual Report 2014 (National Human Rights Commission, 
2014) 87-8. 
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and in 2012, there were 3,642 reported cases.67 While these increase numbers may simply 
reflect an increase in reporting rather than occurrences, they do unveil the underlying problem 
and underscore the relevance of the recommendations which states made during Nigeria’s UPR 
I. France recommended that Nigeria should “[i]mprove the conditions of detention within 
prisons, access to health and the respect for the most elementary rights of detainees”.68 The UK 
recommended that Nigeria “[t]ake action to tackle the backlog of prisoners who have been 
detained without trial or beyond the end of their sentence”69 and Belgium recommended that 
Nigeria “[t]ake specific measures in order to address the dis-functioning of the judicial system 
and the lack of internal and external monitoring of the police”.70 As indicated on Table 1 above, 
this was the fourth most prominent issue during Nigeria’s UPR I, accounting for about 5% of 
the total recommendations.  
However, in terms of implementation, very little progress was made by the state within the 
implementation period. There were efforts to reform the criminal justice system with new 
judges appointed at all levels.71 However, according to the NHRC, Nigeria’s pre-trial system 
continues to violate human rights, the prison system is below UN Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners and police oversight bodies remain weak and unable to monitor 
the excesses of the police.72 Nevertheless, in 2015, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
was enacted to reform the criminal justice sector.73 While this falls outside the implementation 
period for UPR I, it lends more support to the acculturation argument (examined in the section 
4 below) which underscores the potential for the UPR to, over time, influence changes within 
states.  
III.2.2 Women’s Rights 
According to the Nigerian NHRC, reports of violence against women grew by alarming 
proportions within the first cycle of the UPR. In 2009, the NHRC received 30 reported cases 
                                                          
67 After 2012, there was decline in the number of cases reported. See ibid, 52. 
68 HRC UPR I Report – Nigeria (note 27 above), para 41. 
69 Ibid para 25. 
70 Ibid para 64. 
71 See The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, above n 51. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (Nigeria). 
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of domestic violence.74 In 2010, this number rose to 325 and in 2011 and 2012, there were over 
2,500 reported cases of domestic violence.75 Also, Nigeria has the highest number of reported 
female genital mutilation (FGM) cases in the world, accounting for about one-quarter of the 
estimated 115-130 million circumcised women worldwide.76 Therefore states were justified to 
place women’s rights issues at the top of Nigeria’s UPR I recommendations, receiving more 
recommendations (about 21%) than any other issue (see Table 1 above). Many of these 
recommendations required the Nigerian government to implement legislation against sexual 
and gender based violence, undertake awareness raising campaigns to eradicate FGM and enact 
legislation to prohibit FGM.77  
Implementing these recommendations within the UPR I implementation period proved 
challenging for the state. As observed by the NHRC, few state governments within Nigeria 
enacted laws on FGM but there was no federal legislation on FGM, discrimination against 
women, child marriage and betrothal or gender based violence.78 Many of these 
recommendations which were not implemented were vital in improving the human rights 
situation on the ground. However, as earlier noted, over time some of these recommendations 
have been implemented, even though outside the UPR I implementation timeframe. In 2015, 
the Violence against Persons Prohibition Act was passed into federal law. This Act specifically 
addresses violence against women including FGM in Article 6 and prescribes a penalty of up 
to 4 years imprisonment and or a fine.79 While the Act can be criticised for its failure to 
recognise the particular vulnerability of women to violence by replacing the word ‘women’ 
with “persons”, it nevertheless demonstrates a positive move by the government of Nigeria in 
its fight against violence against women and other vulnerable persons. This is supplemented 
by a 4 year National Policy and Plan of Action for the Elimination of FGM in Nigeria which 
identifies and engages key stakeholders at the federal, state and community levels.80 However, 
                                                          
74  This continues to prevail despite section 46 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which protects women 
against violence and discrimination. See The National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, Annual Report 2014, 
above n 66, 52. 
75 Ibid 52. 
76 NPC and UNICEF Nigeria, ‘Children's and Women's right in Nigeria: A wake up call - Situation Assessment 
and Analysis of Harmful Traditional Practice (FGM)’ (Abuja 2001) 195-200. 
77 HRC UPR I Report – Nigeria (note 27 above), paras 18, 62, 71, 77 and 83. 
78 See The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, above n 51, para 18. 
79 Nigeria: Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act, 2015 (VAPP) [Nigeria] (25 May 2015). 
80 Federal Ministry of Health Abuja, National Policy and Plan of Action for the Elimination of Federal Genital 
mutilation in Nigeria 2013-2017 (Federal Ministry of Health Abuja, 2013). 
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there has been no evidence of their enforcement and reports indicate that the practice of FGM 
“remain widespread, with low rates of reporting”.81  
III.2.3 Torture, Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
In 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
observed that torture was an intrinsic part of law enforcement methods in Nigeria.82 Section 34 
(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria expressly provides that “no person shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatmen”.83 Furthermore, Article 4 of the Convention 
against Torture provides that “[e]ach state party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences 
under its criminal law”.84 This is a non-derogable right and a peremptory norm of international 
law. Despite these, the number of cases reported to the Nigerian NHRC between 2009 and 
2012 was on the rise. In 2009, the number of reported cases was at 94 but in 2010 the number 
had risen to 1,403 and in 2012 the number stood at 2,230.85 It was in this light that states like 
Benin, Ukraine, The Netherlands and Denmark, recommended that Nigeria should “establish 
a national preventive mechanism to align itself with its neighbours positive practices”; “[s]tep 
up its efforts to halt torture and ill-treatment”; adopt legislative measures to prevent and 
prosecute acts of torture and other ill-treatment; and “[p]revent using cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment”.86 These recommendations accounted for about 15% of the total 
recommendations made to Nigeria during UPR I. 
With regard to their implementation, in 2009, Nigeria set up the National Committee Against 
Torture (NCAT) as a national preventative mechanism.87 The NCAT is mandated amongst 
other things to receive and consider complaints on torture; conduct visits to places of detention 
                                                          
81 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Nigeria: Prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM) among 
the Urhobo, including the consequences for refusing to undergo this procedure, particularly pregnant women; 
state protection available (2014-March 2015)’ (2015) http://www.refworld.org/docid/56498d834.html. 
82 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak: addendum: mission to Nigeria (4 to 10 March 2007), UN 
Doc A/HRC/7/3/Add.4 (22 November 2007) para 40. 
83 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), s 34 (1). 
84 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature 10 December 1984, UNTS 1465 (entered into force 26 June 1987); Nigeria ratified the Optional Protocol 
of the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) in 2009. See also Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. 
85 The National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, Annual Report 2013 (National Human Rights Commission, 
2013). 
86 HRC UPR I Report – Nigeria (note 27 above), para 103.1. 
87 Federal Ministry of Justice (Nigeria), ‘Mandate of the National Committee on Torture’ (2010) < 
http://www.apt.ch/content/files/npm/africa/Nigeria_NPM_ToR.pdf>; 
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and examine allegations of torture therein; review the treatment of persons in detention with a 
view to prevent torture; develop a national anti-torture policy and propose anti-torture 
legislation.88 The NCAT has partnered with the NHRC to organise training workshops and 
sensitise relevant actors on the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) and its Optional 
Protocol.89 
Despite these efforts, torture continues to persist. The Nigerian Criminal and Penal code does 
not explicitly prohibit torture and the NCAT does not have investigatory or prosecutorial 
powers.90 This is arguably inconsistent with the constitutional provision and international 
obligation earlier mentioned. Force Order 237 of Nigeria’s Police Regulations contributes to 
the ongoing use of torture by permitting police officers to shoot detainees and suspects who 
attempt to escape or avoid arrest, regardless of whether they pose a threat to life.91 Nevertheless, 
the work undertaken by the NCAT is a significant step. There has recently been a decline in 
the number of reported cases of torture and other cruel inhuman and degrading treatment 
between 2012 and 2014, from 1920 reported cases to below 400.92 But Nigeria is yet to 
recognise the competence of the Committee against Torture to receive communications from 
individuals under article 22 of CAT. 
It can be observed from the above analysis that the Nigerian government engaged with the 
implementation of many of its UPR I recommendations. This underscores the potential for 
cooperative mechanisms to contribute to human rights changes within states. As explained by 
Elvira Domínguez Redondo, “those in charge of human rights mechanisms, scholars and 
practitioners tend to neglect the potential value of cooperative approaches to human rights 
implementation and focus instead on the confrontational approaches”93 While this section 
demonstrates the potential for the UPR to improve the human rights situation on the ground, it 
examined decoupling gap between the recommendations accepted on the one hand and those 
implemented on the other (including both FI and PI). This is represented by more than 50% of 
                                                          
88 Ibid; National Committee against Torture, ‘Fourth Quarterly Report of the National Committee against Torture 
to the United Nations Sub Committee against Torture in Geneva, Switzerland (2015) < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/OPCAT/NPM/Nigeria2014.pdf>.  
89 The National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, Annual Report 2014, above n 66, 63-4. 
90 See The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, above n 51, para 22. 
91 See Federal Ministry of Justice (Nigeria), ‘Mandate of the National Committee on Torture’ (2010) < 
http://www.apt.ch/content/files/npm/africa/Nigeria_NPM_ToR.pdf>; 
92 The National Human Rights Commission Nigeria, Annual Report 2014, above n 66, 52. 
93 Elvira Domínguez Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review-Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in 
Human Rights Implementation?’ (2012) 4 New Zealand Law Review 673, 683. 
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recommendations not implemented within the implementation time periodic. As earlier 
indicated, my analysis does not assert a direct causal link between a state’s action and specific 
UPR recommendations. Rather, it considers the extent to which the UPR contributed to the 
realisation of human rights changes within states. The implementation of recommendations, 
especially on justice and detention, women’s rights and torture, as examined above still 
represent significant challenges in Nigeria, which, as argued in the next section, can be 
narrowed over time. 
IV. ACCULTURATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON NIGERIA’S UPR ENGAGEMENT 
4.1. The Theory of Acculturation 
According to Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, acculturation is ‘the general process by which 
actors adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture, without actively 
assessing either the merits of those beliefs and behaviours or the material costs and benefits of 
conforming to them.’94 The theory of acculturation calls into question the view that compliance 
with human rights norms is best induced by the exercise of coercive power or by binding 
decisions emanating from human rights monitoring institutions.95 Central to the acculturation 
theory is that power is not merely prohibitive, material and centralised but also productive, 
cultural and diffuse.96 Goodman and Jinks argue that mechanisms based on coercion are 
inadequate because coercion ‘fails to grasp the complexity of the social environment within 
which states act.’97 Monitoring and reporting are highly effective and important functions in 
an acculturation-based institutional regime, while sanctions and binding decisions are 
potentially counterproductive.98 The acculturation approach shows preference for ‘soft’ 
mechanisms but does not call for a complete abandonment of coercive mechanisms. Rather, it 
                                                          
94 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2013) 22. 
95 See De Frouville (note 10 above) 254; Nowak, ‘It’s Time for a World Court of Human Rights’ (note 14 above) 
23. 
96 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (note 
94 above) 122. 
97 See Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law’ (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 625. 
98 Ibid 699. 
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argues that acculturation, like coercion, is more likely to succeed under certain conditions or 
when combined with other mechanisms.99  
The ‘microprocesses’ of acculturation which include ‘mimicry’ and ‘identity’ propel cognitive 
and social pressures which drive a state to adopt socially legitimate attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviours.100 Mimicry relates to states copying the behaviour of other states. Acculturation 
involves a social pressure to conform to the behaviour of a reference group and conformity 
produces mimicry. This mimicry model proposed by Goodman and Jinks has been applied to 
other areas of international law.101 In particular, James Munro argues that acculturation 
explained the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR), whereby ASEAN states copied other states and regional organisations in the process 
and effectively mimicked a pattern of global behaviour.102  
Goodman and Jinks argue that ‘identification’ is the touchstone of the theory of 
acculturation.103 By identifying themselves with a reference group, states generate varying 
degrees of social and cognitive pressures to conform to the norms of that group.104 The social 
environment within which states act propels internal cognitive and social pressures which drive 
a state to adopt socially legitimate attitudes and beliefs. In his review on the theory of 
acculturation, Harold Koh validates the theory of acculturation as a case study of internalisation 
through socialisation.105 He argues that by focusing on acculturation over coercion, Goodman 
and Jinks unmask a new approach to influence state compliance with human rights law through 
a ‘complex interaction between process and ideas.’106   
The UPR mechanism shows the power of peer pressure and global culture in enforcing human 
rights law through state influence. Acculturation particularly favours the UPR mechanism 
because it is based on peer review and not configured to involve a selected group of insiders 
                                                          
99 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘International Law and State Socialisation: Conceptual, Empirical and 
Normative Challenges’ (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 983, 991. 
100 Goodman and Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialisation and International Human Rights Law’ (note 97 
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101 Michael Stein and Alex Geisinger, ‘A Theory of Expressive International Law’ (2007) 60 Vanderbilt Law 
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102 James Munro, ‘The relationship between the origins and regime design of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)’ (2011) 15 (8) The International Journal of Human Rights 1185. 
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(experts), examining or reviewing those considered as outsiders (states). This helps to dispel 
the perception of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. According to Goodman and Jinks, the cognitive and social 
pressures generated by the acculturation micro process of identification is more effective when 
an International Governmental Organisation provides universal membership and subjects all 
member states to review.107 Maria Stavropoulou has examined the acculturation theory in the 
context of refugee protection. She found that refugee protection regimes could explore the 
benefits of inclusive membership through the creation of additional fora building on 
acculturation techniques.108 The UPR mechanism is inclusive, cooperative and collaborative, 
and has in two cycles of the UPR achieved a 100% state cooperation rate.109 The cornerstone 
principles of the UPR – universality and cooperation, can be effective in harnessing the social 
and cognitive pressures associated with acculturation which can facilitate the social learning 
process of states as they engage with the UPR process.  However, as observed by Goodman 
and Jinks, acculturation can produce a ‘decoupling’ situation where public conformity with 
human rights norms is disconnected from local practice.110 
4.2. Narrowing Nigeria’s UPR Implementation Gap: The Impact of Acculturation 
Nigeria has made major commitments in its UPR engagement and is a party to major 
international human rights instruments. Despite this, implementation has often proved 
problematic. As the findings above indicate, more than half of the UPR I recommendations 
were not implemented by Nigeria. Narrowing the gap between a government’s human rights 
rhetoric and its human rights actions is crucial for the human rights situation on the ground to 
be improved. But can this gap be narrowed? 
The gap between compelling human rights rhetoric and meaningful political change is often a 
sizeable one.111 However, it is arguable that over time, shallow or rhetorical human rights 
commitments will resonate to deeper commitments through a process that Jon Elster refers to 
                                                          
107 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law (note 
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as the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”.112 Elster reasoned that rhetorical commitments, though 
hypocritically made, can lead to some positive outcomes over time because an actor would 
hardly deviate from the principled position to which he has publicly committed himself.113 
States respond to global cultural forces just like individuals and organisations respond to 
cultural forces within their wider environment. By identifying themselves with a reference 
group, states generate varying degrees of social and cognitive pressures to conform to the 
norms of that group.114 Identification as a microprocess of acculturation has been exploited to 
drive states to make human rights commitments. Identification occurs “when an individual 
accepts influence because he wants to establish or maintain a satisfying relationship with 
another person or group.”115 The social environments within which states act propel internal 
cognitive and social pressures which drive states to adopt socially legitimate attitudes and 
beliefs.116 The interest of Nigeria to identify itself with the cooperative and inclusive UPR 
mechanism, can over time facilitate its acculturation.  
In the analysis above on Nigeria’s UPR engagement, acculturation through identification was 
evident in several ways. Identifying itself with the African Group generated internal social and 
cognitive pressures which induced Nigeria to accept a high percentage of recommendations 
from its referenced group.117 While acceptance of UPR recommendations does not yield 
automatic implementation, it is a positive step towards implementation. While some may see 
the existence of this regional alliance as detrimental to the UPR process,118 I argue, it could 
favour the process of acculturation. States may tend to be more receptive to sensitive 
recommendations coming from the regional group they identify with, than from other groups. 
An example of the power of identification was evident during Nigeria’s review. During UPR 
                                                          
112 Jon Elster, ‘Deliberation and Constitution Making’ in Jon Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 111. 
113 Ibid 104. 
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I, Nigeria accepted a general recommendation (R 4) touching on the death penalty from 
Benin,119 but rejected similar general recommendations from Western states such as the UK 
and Sweden.120 Also, during UPR II, Chad accepted a recommendation from Cape Verde (on 
violence against women, female genital mutilation and forced marriages), but rejected a similar 
recommendation from Italy, even though both recommendations addressed the same issues and 
fell in the same action category.121 This provides evidence of the positive outcome of 
identification as a micro process of acculturation by causing recommendations made by states 
within a regional block, which otherwise may not have been accepted, to be accepted by 
members of that regional block. However, the extent to which the UPR could transform the 
culture on gay rights within African states through acculturation remains to be seen, but the 
cognitive pressures associated with acculturation are an important part of the process. 
Cognitive pressures associated with the acculturation micro process of identification can push 
the language of human rights into some moral commitments within particular cultures even in 
terms that challenge one or more aspects of that culture. Benjamin Gregg employed a cognitive 
approach rather than a normative one to show how human rights norms can be advanced as 
rights internal to any given community’s culture by means of cognitive re-framing.122 He 
argued that “an idea once external can become internal through system-level learning.”123 
While examining the issue of female genital mutilation in Africa, he noted that a cognitive rule 
can be deployed that revises local normative rules that justify female genital mutilation, but 
that such a cognitive rule has to be “indigenized.”124 For example reframing female genital 
mutilation as a technical, medical issue rather than a normative human rights concern can 
                                                          
119 HRC UPR I Report – Nigeria (note 27 above), para 14. 
120 Ibid. Another example of the positive impact of regionalism in the UPR, with regard to Africa states, was 
evident in the review of Chad. During Chad’s UPR II, Togo and Czech Republic recommended that Chad ‘Ratify 
the Optional Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.’ Even 
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January 2014) para 110.18 and 110.120. 
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advance the human rights issue as internal to the African culture.125 Such an approach can be 
equally beneficial to other cultural aspects affecting the engagement of Nigeria with the UPR. 
As the acculturation process progresses, it will be difficult for a state to sustain purely rhetorical 
commitments because of external “audience” effects. External audience effects are generated 
by national and transnational human rights advocacy networks when they engage governments 
in a dialogue about norm implementation and hold them accountable for their human rights 
rhetoric. The publicity of a government’s UPR commitments creates expectations among 
informed citizens and NGOs/CSOs, making it difficult for the government to contradict or 
deviate from the accepted commitment/recommendations. Dia in his study126 noted how the 
Communist regimes’ commitments under the Helsinki Accords were frequently referenced in 
popular struggles for freedom of association and freedom of expression.127 Citizens over time 
may pressure their government to live up to their human rights rhetoric and commitments. This 
is referred to by O’Brien and Li as “rightful resistance”.128 They suggest that this grows from 
the space created when the state’s international commitment is disconnected from local 
practice.129 According to O’Brien and Li, “so long as a gap exists between rights promised and 
rights delivered, there is always room for rightful resistance to emerge.”130 In the case of 
Nigeria, there is a space for civil society to hold the government accountable for its UPR 
commitments. A strategic and well-coordinated campaign by NGOs can contribute to 
meaningful human rights improvement within a state. 
Continuous engagement of Nigeria with the UPR process has the potential to over time narrow 
the implementation gap. As earlier indicated, some of the UPR I recommendations to Nigeria 
that were not implemented during the specified time were subsequently implemented. The 
adoption of a UPR implementation action plan would accelerate and provide greater certainty 
on the implementation process. In addition, continuous engagement with the UPR process may 
over time influence states even on issues which it rejected in its previous review. As 
                                                          
125 Human Rights Norms against Child Prostitution in Asia were advanced internally by means of cognitive re-
framing. See ibid 289. 
126 Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
127 Ibid 120. 
128 Kevin J O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 15-
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governments within nations change, so do their views on human rights issues so as to identify 
with the wider community with which they interact. This was the case with Côte d’Ivoire. 
During UPR I, the government of President Laurent Gbagbo rejected recommendations from 
the UK, Brazil and Czech Republic to sign and ratify OP-CAT. 131  During UPR II, the 
government of President Alassane Ouattara accepted the same recommendations from states 
such as Ghana, Tunisia, Czech Republic, Uruguay and Burkina Faso.132 With the new Nigerian 
government that was elected in 2015, it remains to be determined whether specific 
recommendations on the death penalty and the rights of sexual minorities may subsequently 
receive a positive response from the new government during UPR III. Acculturation in this 
context is seen as a continuous process which may over time produce a positive outcome.133  
V. THE SPIRAL EFFECT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM ON NIGERIA’S 
UPR ENGAGEMENT 
Just as terrorism has a grave impact on human rights, so too anti-terrorism laws and policies 
can have serious implications for human rights and individual freedoms.134 When conflicts 
within or between states pose a threat to the nation or citizens, governments easily justify 
repressive measures and human rights considerations may thereby be weakened. The role of 
conflict and security threats in Nigeria in hindering norm compliance is an important aspect to 
consider when examining its engagement with the UPR. There is always a tendency for 
governments to trade off human rights considerations in the name of counter-terrorism 
measures or national security. Human rights violations mostly committed by governments 
under the pretext of counter terrorism measures include torture, extra-judicial executions and 
secret and arbitrary detention. During UPR I, Nigeria accepted a recommendation to take “all 
practical measures” to end “extrajudicial executions” and “step up its measures to halt 
torture.”135 This section considers whether the escalation of the conflict between the 
                                                          
131 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Cote d’Ivoire, 
13th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/13/9 (4 January 2010) paras 101.7–101.9. 
132 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Cote d’Ivoire, 
27th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/27/6 (7 July 2014) paras 127.3-127.4 and 127.5 respectively. 
133 For a description of process and outcome-based conceptions of acculturation See John W Berry, ‘Conceptual 
Approaches to Acculturation’ in Kevin M Chung, Pamela Ball Organista and Gerardo Marin (eds), Acculturation: 
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government and Boko Haram terrorist group after UPR I had a regressive effect on Nigeria’s 
subsequent engagement with the UPR. 
There is some obscurity surrounding the origin of Boko Haram. Attempts at explaining the 
origin and leadership of the group have generated some confusion.136 Boko Haram, literally 
translated to mean “western education/civilization is sin,” is a sect whose early recruits were 
indoctrinated “to believe that their state of hopelessness was caused by government which 
imposed Western education on them and failed to manage the resources of the country to their 
benefits.”137 
While the existence of the sect has been traced as far back as 1995,138 it was only after Nigeria’s 
UPR I in 2009 that the conflict between the sect and the government escalated. Two particular 
incidents escalated the conflict between the government and Boko Haram terrorist group. These 
were the bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja on 16 June 2011 and the 
bombing of the United Nations House in Abuja on 26 August 2011. Prior to these incidents, 
Boko Haram was apparently not understood as a threat to peace and to the protection of human 
rights in Nigeria and the region. None of the 32 recommendations during Nigeria’s UPR I 
session on 9 February 2009 addressed the issue of terrorism. It only became a major concern 
during UPR II on 27 October 2013, receiving three recommendations from France, Portugal 
and the Republic of Korea.139 
A major counter terrorism response by the Nigerian government immediately followed the two 
major incidents above. The government enacted the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (hereafter 
‘TPA’).140 This was amended on February 21, 2013 by the Terrorism (Prevention) 
(Amendment) Act 2013 (hereafter ‘TPA’ as Amended). While most of its provisions are human 
rights compliant, some are not. Some counter terrorism measures have been found to have 
                                                          
136 See Simeon H O Alozieuwa, ‘Contending Theories on Nigeria’s Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram 
Insurgency’ (2012) 7(1) Peace and Conflict Review 1. 
137 N C Okereke, ‘Implementing the Nigerian Defence Policy: Reflections on the Boko Haram Crisis’ in O Mbachu 
and A A Sokoto (eds), Nigerian Defence and Security: Policies and Strategies (Medusa Academic Publishers Ltd, 
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Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency’ (2012) 7(1) Peace and Conflict Review 1. 
138 Jideofo Adibe, ‘Boko Haram: One Sect, Conflicting Narratives’ (2012) 9(1) African Renaissance 50. 
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grave impact on the enjoyment of human rights.141 For example section 32(1) of TPA (as 
Amended) which provides that the Federal High Court “shall have the sole jurisdiction to try 
an offence and impose the penalties specified in this Act”142 is in conflict with the Child Rights 
Act 2003,143 pursuant to which a child is to be tried by a Family Court.144 This also goes against 
the UPR recommendations Nigeria accepted from Poland and Slovakia to “[e]nsure that neither 
the death penalty nor life sentence is imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 
years of age”.145 
Furthermore, subjecting the proscribed acts or omissions in the TPA146 (including “threats”) 
“to maximum of death penalty”,147 irrespective of the gravity of the offence, is open to abuse 
and undermines the principle of proportionality. Amnesty International notes this fact and other 
inconsistencies with the TPA to which it stated:  
Key provisions of the Act are incompatible with Nigeria’s human rights 
obligations. Many of the provisions of the Act use terms and definitions 
that are imprecise and overbroad in scope, violating the ‘legality’ 
requirement for criminal offences, and/or unlawfully restricting a range 
of rights – such as freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom 
of opinion and expression, freedom of association and freedom of 
assembly – by failing to adhere to the requirements of demonstrable 
proportionality... some provisions relating to investigation, detention, 
and trial are not consistent with various provisions of human rights 
law.148 
Another prominent issue during Nigeria’s UPR related to the government’s anti-terrorism 
campaign was torture and extra-judicial executions. Six states including Benin, Germany and 
Portugal recommended during UPR I that Nigeria investigate and put an end to the use of 
                                                          
141 See Edward Mogirea and Kennedy Mkutu Agade, ‘Counter-terrorism in Kenya’ (2011) 29(4) Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 473; Arthur Chaskalson, ‘The Widening Gyre: Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights 
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(Springer, 2010) 389. 
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torture and extra-judicial executions by the police.149 These recommendations were accepted 
by the Nigerian government.  
Despite the above UPR commitment to end extra-judicial executions, there has been an 
increase in extra-judicial executions. Government security forces have been implicated in 
numerous extra-judicial killings, torture, and other serious human rights abuses.150 The 
escalation of violence between Boko Haram and the government was prompted by an act of 
extra-judicial execution.151 It was the death of Yussuf, a Boko Haram leader in police custody 
that triggered Boko Haram to perpetuate the two major bombings in 2011 as acts of 
retaliation.152 During UPR II on Nigeria, HRAN reported an increase in the number of extra-
judicial executions, torture and ill treatment committed by the Joint Task Force set up by the 
government in the name of fighting terrorism.153 
Amnesty International also reported an increase in the number of extra-judicial executions by 
the government. It reported that over 950 people died in detention facilities ran by the Joint 
Task Force within the first six months of 2013.154 Similarly, just one month after Nigeria’s 
UPR I, Human Rights Watch documented 28 alleged extra-judicial executions committed by 
the government police between 28 July and 1 August 2009155 and 27 extra-judicial executions 
carried out by the military in Maiduguri between July 2009 and May 2012.156 The Nigerian 
National Human Rights Commission in its UPR II submission noted that there is no body set 
up to monitor and investigate extra-judicial executions in Nigeria and that the National 
Committee against Torture has no investigative powers.157 During UPR II, Portugal 
recommended that the Nigerian government should tackle the problem of extra-judicial 
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executions by mainstreaming human rights into counter terrorism laws and policies.158 This 
can contribute to draw a clear line between law enforcement and terrorism. Besides, torture 
and extra-judicial executions are non-derogable rights recognised by international human rights 
law and Nigeria (as of February 2017) did not officially derogate from the ICCPR in its counter 
terrorism campaign. 159 Nigeria accepted all five recommendations during UPR II to end, 
prevent and investigate extra-judicial executions and torture by security forces, and to 
guarantee respect for human rights in its fight against terrorism.160 The extent to which this is 
implemented can only be determined by the end of UPR II implementation timeframe in 2018. 
Acculturation falls within the broader socialisation theory on the ways in which human rights 
norms become socialised into domestic settings of states. Prominent among these theories is 
the five-stage spiral model developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink. A major deficiency in the 
various theories of human rights norm socialisation is their failure to consider the regressive 
effect of serious conflicts and security threats on human rights norm implementation. This 
section with focus on Boko Haram terrorism has demonstrated that conflicts and security 
threats can have a regressive effect on state human rights compliance. The fight against Boko 
Haram terrorism in Nigeria has contributed to an increase by government police and militia in 
the perpetuation of torture and extra-judicial executions, despite its UPR commitments and 
other human rights obligations.  
CONCLUSION 
This article, with a focus Nigeria, underscores the potential for human rights mechanisms based 
on cooperation and dialogue to help cause human rights changes within states in a subtle but 
significant way. Exclusive reliance on coercive/confrontational mechanisms could undermine 
the potential for cooperative mechanisms to contribute to human rights changes within states. 
Elvira Domínguez Redondo earlier expressed this point when he states: 
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[T]hose in charge of human rights mechanisms, scholars and practitioners tend 
to neglect the potential value of cooperative approaches to human rights 
implementation and focus instead on the confrontational approaches161 
The UPR provides a platform for acculturation that promotes cooperation and encourages 
continuous improvement of the human rights situation within states. Applying the theory of 
acculturation contributes to an understanding of the efficacy of human rights strategies based 
on cooperation. As a cooperative mechanism, the UPR can be beneficial in realising 
incremental progress in human rights, as opposed to immediate, especially towards the 
decriminalisation of same-sex relations which is a culturally sensitive issue within Nigeria and 
many other African states. 
Nigeria’s acceptance of most of the UPR I and II recommendations (about 90% and 84% 
respectively), indicate its receptiveness to peer recommendations. However, an important 
aspect limiting the extent of this receptiveness was cultural relativism. Cultural relativism 
limited Nigeria’s active engagement as it was not willing to accept recommendations on sexual 
orientation which it considered hyper-sensitive in socio-cultural terms. Regionalism on the 
other hand attracted a stronger engagement from Nigeria evidenced by its acceptance of all 
UPR I recommendations from African states and rejecting only about 1% of their 
recommendations during UPR II. Some may perceive regionalism to be detrimental to the UPR 
mechanism. This is true to the extent that it may prevent cooperation across the regional group 
and affect the universality of the UPR process. However, this may not entirely be the case 
because it facilitates acculturation by causing recommendations made by the regional block, 
which otherwise may not have been accepted, to be accepted by members of that regional 
block. 
Nigeria’s implementation of UPR recommendations provided further insights into the potential 
value of the UPR process by the extent to which it contributed to improve the human rights 
situation on the ground. About 45% of the recommendations which were either fully or partially 
implemented by Nigeria indicated an important contribution of the UPR in improving the 
human rights situation on the ground. However, there is a significant compliance gap which 
poses a major challenge as was addressed on issues such as justice and detention, women’s 
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rights and torture. But as was argued, acculturation can narrow this gap over time through the 
internal and external audience effects generated by effective NGO engagement. This was seen 
in instances where certain steps where taking by the state to implement UPR recommendations 
beyond the implementation timeframe. 
In particular, issues that are hyper-sensitive in African cultural terms such as the 
recommendations on sexual orientation can be addressed by internal cognitive pressures 
through Greggs cognitive re-framing approach. Approaches that employ coercion or 
recommend immediate normative solutions may experience negative resistance which may 
cause further regression. For example, calls for immediate decriminalisation or threats, such as 
David Cameron’s threat to withhold UK aid from governments that do not reform legislation 
banning homosexuality,162 was met with specific legislation further criminalising same sex 
unions in some countries like Nigeria and Uganda.163  This further indicates the limits and 
dangers of coercive or confrontational approaches in addressing human rights issues which are 
perceived to be hyper-sensitive in socio-cultural terms.  
Equally important from the analysis in this article was that conflicts and security threats such 
as terrorism can have a regression effect on a state’s human rights compliance. Despite 
Nigeria’s UPR commitment with respect to putting a moratorium on the death penalty and 
ending torture and extrajudicial execution, the escalation of the conflict between Boko Haram 
and the government resulted in further human rights violation. It is therefore important for the 
state to mainstream human rights standards in its counter terrorism approach. Notwithstanding, 
the UPR mechanism has the potential to address major human rights concerns in an inclusive 
and cooperative manner that can lead to incremental improvement of the human rights situation 
on the ground. While there is the potential for acculturation by way of identification and 
cognitive pressures from peers, terrorism and political instability may present a risk of 
regression but the potential value of the UPR process in addressing human rights concerns with 
states should not be undermined. 
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